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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah,
Section 78-2-2(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and Rules
3(a) and 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the oral agreement between Earl Grossen and Ogden

Dewitt fall within the statute of frauds (Section 25-5-1 et
seq.)?
2.

If so, did the partial performance exception take that

oral agreement out of the statute of frauds?
3.

If so,

did Ogden Dewitt fully perform under the oral

agreement?
4.

Is Utah Code Section 57-1-31 applicable in this case?

5.

Did the trial court error in releasing the lis pendens?

6.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1.

During a bench trial in this matter, after

counterclaimants had rested their case, the trial court ruled in
counterclaim defendant's favor and entered findings of fact.
Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
"after the [counterclaimant] in an action tried by the court
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence

1

the [counterclaim defendant] without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
[counterclaimant] has shown no right to relief."

"If the court

renders judgment on the merits against the [counterclaimant], the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a),"
42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.)

(Rule

In this case, after the

counterclaimants rested their case the trial court ruled against
counterclaimants and entered findings of fact.
Where the trial court makes findings of fact and enters a
judgment based thereon, as in this case, the facts are not
"examined in the light most favorable to the losing party" as
appellants argue, but the trial court's findings of fact are
upheld on appeal unless "clearly erroneous."

Grayson Roper

Limited Partnership vs. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470(Utah 1989);
Mackay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995) (an appellate
court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court
sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight
of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.")
On appeal, this court should not overturn the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.
STATEMENT OF CASE
In June, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt purchased
property from Earl Grossen, and Earl Grossen took back a note

2

secured by a trust deed on the property for part of the purchase
price.

By September, 1995, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt

were delinquent in payment of taxes on the property, had not
obtained insurance on the property, and were delinquent in
payments under the Trust Deed note.

On September 19, 1995, a

Notice of Default was recorded against the property and mailed to
the trustors.
On December 19, 1995, the three month statutory cure period
under Section 57-1-31 expired.

By that time, no back payments

had been made, no taxes on the property had been paid and no
insurance on the property had been obtained.

Therefore, the

trustee noticed a trustee's sale for February 29, 1996.
On January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the brother of Derel K.
Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, approached Earl Grossen and
offered to pay the back payments, insure the property and pay the
unpaid property taxes.

Earl Grossen tentatively agreed to cancel

the trustee's sale and cancel the Notice of Default if Ogden
Dewitt would do this.
Within the next two weeks, Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617 in
back payments due under the Trust Deed note in the form of two
checks delivered to Mr. Grossen.

By February 13, 1996, however,

the property had not been insured and the real property taxes had
not been paid.

On February 13, 1996, Mr. Grossen advised Ogden

Dewitt in a telephone conversation that the "deal was off" and
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the foreclosure sale would go forward.

Mr. Grossen never cashed

the checks.
This matter was tried before the Honorable Judge Schofield,
Fourth District Court, on March 20, 1997 and on April 7, 1997.
The court thereafter entered Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and concluded that the oral agreement between
Earl Grossen and Ogden Dewitt, even if proven, was unenforceable
under the statute of frauds.

Judge Schofield also ruled that the

partial performance exception to the statute of frauds did not
apply.

From that ruling, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt

have taken this appeal.
FACTS
1.

On June 1, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt

executed a Trust Deed Note (the "Note") and Trust Deed (the
"Trust Deed") in favor of Earl Grossen and Mary Ada Grossen (now
deceased).
2.

(R. 314). l
The Note was secured by the Trust Deed, and was

recorded on June 2, 1993 against certain property in Payson,
Utah, located at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (the
"Property"). (R. 314).
3.

On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor

1

Paragraphes 1-14 of the facts set forth herein are the same
as set forth in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law entered on September 26, 1997, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Appendix A.
4

trustee under the Trust Deed, executed a Notice of Default and
commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Trust Deed
pursuant to Section 57-1-19 et seq. The Notice of Default set
forth three

defaults: 1) payment on the Note was delinquent in

the amount of $1,011.32 as of September 12, 1995, 2) property
taxes on the property were due and owing, 3) there was no
insurance on the property.
4.

(R. 314).

Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had

not paid any property taxes on the Property.

Property taxes for

1993, 1994 and 1995 were due and owing in the amount of $432.11,
$475.74 and $392.86 respectively (which included penalty and
interest.) (R. 314).
5.

Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had

never insured the Property. (R. 313).
6.

On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the

brother of Derel K. Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, contacted
Earl Grossen, the beneficiary under the Trust Deed by telephone.
Earl Grossen and Ogden Dewitt reached a tentative2 agreement
2

The Earl Grossen - Ogden Dewitt agreement was only
tentative:
Q.

Let's talk for a minute about this agreement
you had with Ogden Dewitt. Was this in your
mind a tentative agreement or a finalized
agreement?

A.

(By Earl Grossen) Well, it was tentative in
my mind. It wasn't locked in cement or
locked in any kind of a written agreement.

5

regarding the payment of the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated
was in the amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and
the Property needed to be insured. (R. 313)
7.

Ogden Dewitt also agreed to immediately bring current

all unpaid taxes and insure the Property. (R. 313).
8.

Ogden Dewitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two payments, one

of $1,000 by the following Monday and one of $617.00 paid by the
end of the next week. (R. 313).
9.

Ogden Dewitt tendered both the $1,000 check and the

$617.00 check to Earl Grossen as per their tentative agreement,
but these checks were never cashed. (R. 312).
10.

Neither defendants nor Ogden Dewitt paid any of the

unpaid property taxes or insured the Property. (R. 312).
11.

On or about February 13, 1997, Ogden Dewitt and Earl

Grossen spoke on the telephone and Earl Grossen told Ogden Dewitt
the M e a l was off." (R. 312).
12.

On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the Trustee for

Earl Grossen held a Trustee's Sale at the appointed time and
(Trial Transcript of Earl Grossen's trial testimony, pg 35, lines
3-8, R. 467.)
Q.

Okay. So the deal was open then for how many
days in your mind?

A.

(By Earl Grossen) The tentative agreement —
verbal agreement was open probably a couple
of days, three days. Something like that.

(Trial Transcripts of Earl Grossen's trial testimony, pg 39,
lines 22-25; pg 40, line 1, R. 471-72.)
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place and no other bidders being present, bid in the amount then
due and owing under the Trust Deed Note.

A Trustee's Deed was

then executed by David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying
the property to Earl Grossen.

(R. 312) .

13.

Judgment was filed on May 7, 1997. (R. 311).

14.

Defendants filed their Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend

Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict on June 3,
1997. (R. 314).
15.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were

entered September 26, 1997.

(R. 314).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The oral agreement between Ogden Dewitt and Earl Grossen,
even if proven, was unenforceable under the statute of frauds
since it concerned real property and was a promise by Ogden
Dewitt to answer for the debt of another.

Furthermore, the

"partial performance" exception is inapplicable in this case
since the actions here do not rise to a level necessary to
satisfy the "partial performance" exception.

Section 57-1-31 is

also inapplicable in this case since the statutory right to cure
expired on December 19, 1995.
Within 3 weeks after the checks being tendered, Earl Grossen
advised Ogden Dewitt that "the deal was off" and the foreclosure
sale would proceed on February 29, 1996.
cashed.

The checks were never

The unpaid property taxes were never paid and the
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property was never insured.

Even if the agreement was

enforceable, Ogden Dewitt failed to fully perform and is not
entitled to the benefits thereof.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES THE
OGDEN DEWITT - EARL GROSSEN AGREEMENT TO BE
IN WRITING TO BE ENFORCEABLE.
The statute of frauds requires the Ogden Dewitt - Earl
Grossen agreement to be in writing to be enforceable because it
1) creates "power over or concerning real property," and 2) Ogden
Dewitt is "answering for the debt of another."
A.

The Ogden Dewitt - Earl Grossen Agreement Must Be In

Writing To Be Enforceable Because It "Creates Power Over or
Concerning Real Property."
Utah Code Section 25-5-1 provides that "No estate or
interest in real property... nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner related thereto, shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise... [except] in writing."
In this case, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt granted
Earl Grossen a trust deed (the "Trust Deed") which was recorded
against their property and granted the trustee under the Trust
Deed power to sell the property in the event of default.

On

September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor trustee under
the Trust Deed, recorded a Notice of Default against the property
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setting forth three grounds for default, 1) payments weren't
being made under the Trust Deed note, 2) back property taxes were
unpaid, and 3) the property was uninsured.
and none of these defaults were cured.

Three months passed

A trustee's sale was then

scheduled for February 29, 1996.
On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, who was Derel K.
Dewitt's brother and Afton H. Dewitt's son, called Earl Grossen
on the telephone and the two reached a tentative agreement to
cancel the trustee's sale and cancel the Notice of Default if
Ogden Dewitt paid the back payments, paid the back property taxes
and insured the property.
Under Section 25-5-1, to be enforceable any agreement to
cancel a trustee's sale would have to be in writing, since it
would be an agreement to "surrender" a "power over or concerning
real property."

Any agreement to cancel a Notice of Default

would also have to be in writing since it would also be an
agreement to "surrender" a "power over or concerning real
property."

Therefore, the oral agreement between Earl Grossen

and Ogden Dewitt, even if proven, would have to be in writing
pursuant to Section 25-5-1 to be enforceable.
Furthermore, if an agreement has to be m

writing pursuant

to Section 25-5-1, so does any alteration or modification
thereof.

"The rule is well settled in Utah that if the original

agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement
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that modifies any of the material parts of the original must also
satisfy the statute."
1996).

Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah

"An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be

in writing if the contract that is extinguished falls within the
Statute of Frauds." SCM Land Co. vs. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d
105, 108 (Utah 1986). "It is elementary that when a contract is
required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with
equal force to any alteration or modification thereof."

Zion' s

Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975).

See

also Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020, 1032 (Utah
1928).

In this case, because the Trust Deed and the Notice of

Default had to be in writing, so did any agreement canceling the
Notice of Default or altering or amending the trustee's power of
sale under the Trust Deed.
B.

The Ogden Dewitt - Earl Grossen Agreement Must Be In

Writing To Be Enforceable Because Ogden Dewitt Is "Answering For
the Debt of Another."
Utah Code Section 25-5-4(2) provides that "every promise to
answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another" is void
unless "in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement."

In this case, Ogden Dewitt agreed to answer for the

"debt of another," to wit, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt's
debt to Earl Grossen under the Trust Deed note.

Ogden Dewitt was

not a trustor under the Trust Deed or a signator on the Trust
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Deed note and had no obligation thereunder.

Therefore, under

that section of the statute of frauds, the promise of Ogden
Dewitt to answer for the debt of Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H.
Dewitt was also void since it was a

promise to "'answer for the

debt of another" that was not in writing.
II.

THE PART PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.

The part performance exception to statute of frauds does not
apply in this case because 1) the part performance exception only
applies in specific performance actions, 2) the part performance
in this case was insufficient, and 3) the trial court's findings
of fact on this issue will not be overturned on appeal unless
"clearly erroneous."
A.

The Part Performance Exception Only Applies in Specific

Performance Actions.
Utah Code Section 25-5-8 provides that "Nothing in this
chapter [the statute of frauds] ... shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance."

This is not a case of

specific performance, therefore the part performance exception is
not available.

See McKinnon vs. Corporation of President of

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436
(Utah 1974); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959)
(specific performance); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708,
710 (Utah 1977) (specific performance).
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B.

The Part Performance In This Case Was Insufficient,

Even where an oral agreement falls within the statute of
frauds, the court may nevertheless enforce the oral agreement if
there is sufficient part performance to "estop" the promisor from
denying the agreement.

Under that exception, the level of

performance by the performing party must be so great that to fail
to enforce the agreement would constitute a "fraud" on the
performing party.

See, e.g., Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust

Company, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956) ("Failure to perform on
the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer
who relied");

In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595 (Utah 1953)

("Part performance which will avoid statute of frauds may consist
of any act which puts party performing in such position that
nonperformance by other would constitute fraud"); Utah Mercur
Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. Co., 134 P.2d 1094, 1096
(Utah 1943) ("Part performance which will avoid statute of frauds
may consist of any act which puts party performing in such
position that nonperformance by other would constitute fraud.")
The part performance exception to the statute of frauds only
applies in cases where there has been substantial part
performance over a significant period of time.

See e.g.,

Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959) (the part
performance spanned several years and included both payments and
permanent improvements to the property); Carnesecca v.
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Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977) (the part performance
consisted of taking possession of the land, redeeming it from tax
sale, and expending considerable sums to improve it, including
planting, installing heating and irrigation systems and placing a
well thereon); Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975) (12
years of performance under an oral contract).
In cases where performance is not substantial, the part
performance exception does not apply.

See, e.g., McKmnon vs.

Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 52 9
P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1974) (delivery of two $7,000 checks, which
were not cashed, is not sufficient part performance); Moffat v.
Hoffman, 214 P. 308 (Utah 1923) ($350 improvements and 10 months
living m

property not sufficient part performance.)

In this case, Ogden Dewitt tendered 2 checks in the amount
of $1,617.

Those checks were not cashed and within 3 weeks Ogden

Dewitt was informed that the "deal was off."

The property taxes

were never paid and the property was never insured.

Ogden Dewitt

had lost nothing because the checks were never cashed.
Furthermore, Ogden Dewitt had no interest in the property.

The

trial court's finding of fact that these actions were
insufficient to establish the partial performance exception to
the statute of frauds should be upheld.
C.

The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Derel K. Dewitt

and Afton H. Dewitt Failed to Meet Their Burden of Proving Part

13

Performance or Estoppel Should Not Be Overturned.
Even after Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt briefed this
issue to the trial court and requested that the trial court
reconsider its ruling, the trial court declined:
I decline to reconsider the applicability of
the doctrines of part performance and
estoppel as they relate to the statute of
frauds in this case. On the merits of the
case and where each party was adequately
represented at trial, I feel no compunction
to reconsider the findings or the ruling,
even with the benefit of the parties' new
briefs.
(Ruling, September 15, 1997, page 2, Judge Anthony W. Schofield,
R. 307, a copy thereof is attached hereto as Appendix B.)
Since the issue of part performance and estoppel are factual
issues, the trial court's finding of fact that Derel K. Dewitt
and Afton H. Dewitt failed to meet their burden of proof should
not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.

See, e.g.,

Grayson Roper Limited Partnership vs. Finlmson, 782 P.2d 467,
470 (Utah 1989).
In this case, Ogden Dewitt, a person with no legal interest
in the property, tendered two checks in the amount of $1,617.
These checks were not cashed and within three weeks Ogden Dewitt
was informed that the "deal was off."

Ogden Dewitt lost nothing

because the checks were never cashed.

Ogden Dewitt was informed

that the "deal was off" 16 days before the trustee's sale.
property taxes were never paid and the property was never

14

The

insured.

The trial court's finding that there were insufficient

facts to establish part performance or estoppel should be upheld.
D.

The Cases Cited by Defendants are Inapposite.

The cases cited by Appellants do not support their claim
that the partial performance exception applies in this case. In
Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959), performance
spanned several years and included permanent improvements to the
property as well as payments. In this case, although Mr. Grossen
had two checks in his possession, he never cashed them.

When

back taxes were not paid and insurance was not purchased, Mr.
Grossen advised Ogden Dewitt that the sale would proceed.

If

there is uncertainty as to whether complete performance was to
take place before the trustee's sale was canceled, the court must
find that the terms of the contract were too uncertain to take
the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds and to allow
specific performance.

See Id.

Appellants next rely on Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438
(Utah 1968).

Appellants fail to mention that the language they

quote in that case comes from the dissent's opinion. Furthermore,
unlike Evershed, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt did not rely
on Earl Grossen's representations to their detriment.
were delivered by Ogden Dewitt, but never cashed.

Defendants

were in no worse position than they originally were.
not lost any money.

Two checks

They had

Ogden Dewitt had no ownership interest in
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the property.

He was advised that the "deal was off" on February

13, 1996, 16 days before the trustee's sale.

In short,

appellants' reliance on Evershed is misplaced.
In Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977),
the court ruled that the statute of frauds did not apply since
there was sufficient partial performance.

The specific acts of

part performance in that case were as follows:
Joe has been in possession of the land, redeemed it
from tax sale, expended considerable sums to improve
it, (planting, installing heating and irrigation
systems and placing a well thereon) all of which is
substantial evidence of a fully executed oral contract
of purchase.
Id. at 711.
Those acts go far beyond the two uncashed checks that were
delivered by Dewitt.

The second reason why the court found the

statute of frauds did not apply is because "trusts arising by
implication or operation of law are expressly excluded from the
effects of the statute."

Id.

Again, this is not the case here.

Appellants argue that they have given up a substantial legal
right, and therefore their situation is parallel to the situation
in Carnesecca.

Appellants Brief at 20.

Appellants fail to

explain, however, what ''substantial legal right" they have given
up.

Once again, Carnesecca is much different than this case.
Appellants also incorrectly cite Romrell v. Zions First

National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).

The portion of Romrell

quoted by appellants is nothing more than a summary of one of the
jury instructions used at the trial level.
16

The court did not

need to decide the validity of the instruction since this was a
case in equity and

XN

[w]hen a jury is used in an equity case, it

acts in an advisory capacity."
further stated that

611 P.2d 392, 394.

The court

XN

[t]he general verdict does not indicate the

factual basis for finding an enforceable oral contract, and it
clearly is not for this Court to undertake a canvass of the
record for the purpose, in effect, of making its own findings."
Id. at 395.

The appellate court upheld the lower court's

decision not because the jury instruction was correct, but
because regardless of whether it was correct, the judge had the
discretion to weigh the evidence and make the final decision.
A law review article is also cited by appellants. Appellants
claim the article states that

M>

[a]n admission by the defendant

is, of course, the best parol proof of the existence of an oral
agreement which could then be enforced."
21.

Appellants' Brief at

The cited quote, however, refers to the terms of an oral

agreement, not to the actual existence of an oral agreement.

See

The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral Land
Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964).

Furthermore, this

article is written by a student, which bears even less persuasion
than other authorities.
The case of Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P. 218 (Utah 1893) is
also not cited correctly.

Appellants quote the following

language: "Crucially significant [to the estoppel analysis] was
the fact that the existence of the contract had been admitted as
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true."

Appellants' Brief at 22.

Not only did appellants cite to

the wrong reporter, the quoted language is not to be found in the
entire opinion.
It :s

See Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P.218

(Utah 1893).

true that the court mentioned that "[t]he facts pleaded in

this case are admitted as true," but this is because the case
on appeal from a sustained demurrer.

was

Ld. at 220. The court did

uphold this contract, but in doing so, made it clear that
"[p]ayment of the consideration will not, in general, be deemed
such a part performance as to relieve a parol contract from the
operation of the statute [of frauds]." Ld.

As long as "the

repayment of the consideration will place the parties in the same
situation in which they were before," the court will not
specifically enforce an oral contract.

Id.

The primary reason

that the court upheld the oral contract in that case was because
"the services to be rendered were of such a peculiar character
that it [would be] impossible to estimate their value to the
plaintiff by any pecuniary standard."

Id.

Furthermore, the

party seeking enforcement of the contract had fully performed her
part of the contract. The court relied on full performance of the
contract and the possibility of compensating for damages, rather
than admission of a contract as the appellants have argued.
Appellants also rely on Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516
P.2d 178 (Utah 1973).

They argue that the "Utah Supreme Court

indicated that a party could waive the right to foreclosure by
telling a mortgagor that,

x

No action would be forthcoming if
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defendant paid the aggregate of the payments due.'" Appellants'
Brief at 22 (quoting Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516 P.2d 178
(Utah 1973).

The Utah Supreme Court ruled, however, that this

was an issue to be decided at trial, not on summary judgment, and
that is why the case was remanded.
appellants have tried their case.

In the present case,
The trial court ruled that

accepting, but not cashing, 2 checks for three weeks paid by one
with no interest in the property is not sufficient partial
performance, especially where insurance was not obtained and back
taxes were not paid as agreed.
The final case that appellants rely on is Woolsey v. Brown,
539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).
are distinguishable.

Once again, the facts in that case

The court said, "[ejquity will not permit a

party to accept performance for many years and then claim terms
contrary to the evidence."

Id. at 1039.

In that case,

plaintiffs performed "for 12 years under an oral agreement for
the sale of real property." _Id. at 1038.

Once again, the acts of

partial performance in the cited case go far beyond the two
uncashed checks in this case.

The cases cited in appellants'

brief show a great deal more partial performance than has taken
place in the present action.
III.

OGDEN DEWITT FAILED TO FULLY
PERFORM UNDER THE CONTRACT.

In exchange for Earl Grossen canceling the trustee's sale
and canceling the Notice of Default, Ogden Dewitt also agreed to
immediately bring current any and all taxes and insure the
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property.

(See Facts, paragraph 7 ) . By February 13, 1996,

although Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617, the taxes had not been
paid and the property not insured.

On February 13, 1996, Earl

Grossen told Ogden Dewitt the "deal was off."

The back taxes and

property insurance were never paid by Ogden Dewitt, Derel Dewitt
or Afton Dewitt.

Because Ogden Dewitt failed to fully perform

under the terms of the agreement, he was not entitled to the
benefits of the agreement, to_ wit, canceling the Notice of
Default and canceling the trustee's sale.
To be enforceable, the terms of the oral contract must be
"clear and definite."

Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company,

305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956)

The Dewitts must prove a "certain

definite and unambiguous contract." Hargreaves vs. Burton, 206 P.
262, 264 (Utah 1922).

The oral contract and the terms thereof

must be proven by "clear and definite evidence."

Randall v.

Tracy Collins Trust Company, 305 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1956);
Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101, 102 (Utah 1959)
(plaintiff "must show a clear mutual understanding and a positive
agreement of both parties to the terms of the contract.")

The

contract terms must be fully performed by the party seeking
enforcement of a clear and definite oral contract.
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480 (1956).

Randall v.

In this case, the

oral contract, even if proven, was never fully performed by Ogden
Dewitt and therefore Ogden Dewitt was not entitled to the
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benefits thereof.3
IV, SECTION 57-1-31 IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
Section 57-1-31 is inapplicable in this case because 1)
payment was tendered more than three months after the Notice of
Default was filed, 2) the payment tendered did not cure the
entire default under the Trust Deed, and 3) Ogden Dewitt did not
have standing to cure the default under the Trust Deed.
A.

Payment Was Tendered After the Three Month Cure Period

Had Passed.
Because the $1,617 payment was tendered more than 3 months
after the Notice of Default was filed, there was no statutory
right to cure under Section 57-1-31(1).

Section 57-1-31(1)

provides the trustor under a Trust Deed with a statutory right to
cure any default within 3 months after a Notice of Default is
filed by curing the default and paying costs

and attorney's fees:

[The trustor,] at any time within three
months of the filing for record of notice of
default under such trust deed, if the power
of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the
beneficiary or his successor in interest the
entire amount then due under the terms of
such trust deed (including costs and expenses
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of
such obligation, or trust deed, and the
trustee's and attorney's fees actually
incurred) ... and thereby cure the default
theretofore existing and, thereupon, all
3

If there is uncertainty as to whether complete performance
was to take place before the trustee's sale was to be canceled,
then the court must find that the terms of the agreement were too
uncertain to take the oral agreement out of the statute of
frauds. See, Christensen vs. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah
1959).
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proceedings theretofore had or instituted
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated
and shall be and remain in force and effect
the same as if no such acceleration had
occurred.
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-31(1).
In this case, the Notice of Default was filed on September
19, 1995.

Ogden Dewitt tendered the $1,617 payment after January

25, 1996, which was well after the 3 month statutory right to
cure had lapsed on December 19, 1995.

After that 3 month period

had lapsed, the trustors now had to pay the entire amount due
under the trust deed (approximately $35,000). Section 57-1-31(1)
is inapplicable in this case because Ogden Dewitt's tender was
untimely.
B.

The Payment Tendered Did Not Cure the Default Under the

Trust Deed.
Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617 to Earl Grossen m

the form of

two checks. This did not cure the entire default specified in the
Notice of Default because Ogden Dewitt did not pay the unpaid
property taxes or insure the Property.

This also did not

reimburse Earl Grossen his costs and attorney's fees.

Therefore,

even if the tender had been timely, it did not constitute a cure
within the meaning of Section 57-1-31(2) because it did not cure
the entire default and did not include statutorily required
reimbursement of costs and attorney's fees.
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C.

Ogden Dewitt Had No Standing to Cure Under Section 57-

1-31.
Finally, only a "trustor or his successor in interest" has a
right to cure under Section 57-1-31:
[T]he trustor or his successor in interest in
the trust property or any part thereof or any
other person having a subordinate lien or
encumbrance of record thereon or any
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed...
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-31(1).
Because Ogden Dewitt was not the "trustor or his successor in
interest," he had no statutory right to cure.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR
IN RELEASING THE LIS PENDENS.

Defendants cite Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills,
590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) as justification for asking the court
to reinstate the lis pendens on Grossen's property.

Hidden

Meadows involved an action in equity seeking specific performance
of an option to purchase property.

Defendants cite the language

that, "...the [Supreme] Court has already recognized the full
effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal."
1248.

Hidden Meadows,

However, defendants fail to note that the lis pendens had

not been released after the first trial in the lower court.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court later said in Timm v. Dewsnup, 921
P. 2d 1381, 1393 (1996), "In Hidden Meadows... this court held that
an unreleased lis pendens remains in effect pending appeal."

The

Utah Supreme Court never said a released lis pendens remains in
effect pending appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court never intended to
23

tie the hands of district court judges in order to prevent the
release of a lis pendens incidental to litigation just in case
there might be an appeal.

Such a procedure would destroy

finality in the lower courts and would unnecessarily burden the
alienation of property.

The proper course is for the non-

prevailmg party to obtain a stay pending appeal either from the
court or by filing a supersedeas bond.
VI.

THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
IN THIS MATTER.

The original judgment m
1997.

this matter was filed on May 7,

On June 3, 1997, appellants filed their Rule 52(b) Motion

to Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict.

One of the basis

for denying that motion was that the motion was not filed within
10 days, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
[Defendants' motion is untimely. Apparently
counsel for defendants thought he had 30 days
to file his Rule 52 (b) motion when m fact
only 10 are allowed. The rule states, "Upon
motion of a party made no later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend
its findings or make additional findings and
may amend the judgment accordingly." Rule
52(b) URCP. The Rule does allow for a motion
to amend a judgment to be filed at the same
time as a motion for a new trial (Rule 59),
but Rule 59(e) provides, "A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not
later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment." The judgment was filed on May 7,
1997. The defendants filed their motion to
amend the findings and judgment on June 3,
1997. The motion is untimely and therefore
must be denied.
(Ruling, September 15, 1997, pgs 1-2, Judge Anthony W. Schofield,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B.)

24

Because that post-judgment motion was not timely filed, it did
not toll the appeal period and the Notice of Appeal was not filed
within 30 days of May 7, 1997.

Therefore, the Notice of Appeal

was not timely filed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should
be affirmative in its entirety.
DATED this

/ y? day of October, 1998

lusselS*<A. w n n e
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Counterclaim Defendant,
and Appellee
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Ruling, Dated September 5, 1997.
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Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline, L.C,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EARL L. GROSSEN#
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,

: AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
:

vs.

:
:

DEREL K. DEWITT and AFTON H.
DEWITT,

:
:

Defendants and
Counterclaimants.

:
:

CIVIL NO.

960400326

This matter having been tried before the Court on March 20,
1997 and again on April 7, 1997, plaintiff and counterclaim
defendant, Earl Grossen being represented by Russell A. Cline and
defendants and Counterclaimcints Afton H. Dewitt and Derel K. Dewitt
being represented by Gordon Duval and Shawn Gouzman, and defendants
thereafter having filed a Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and
Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict, and the Court having
heard all the evidence in this matter and good cause appearing,
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finds, concludes and orders as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 1, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt

executed a Trust Deed Note (the "Note") and Trust Deed (the "Trust
Deed") in

favor

of

Earl

Grossen

and Mary Ada

Grossen

(now

deceased).
2.

The Note was secured by the Trust Deed, and was recorded

on June 2, 1993 against certain property in Payson, Utah, located
at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (the "Property").
3.

On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor

trustee under the Trust Deed, executed a Notice of Default and
commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Trust Deed
pursuant to Section 57-1-19 et seq. The Notice of Default set forth
three

defaults: 1) payment on the Note was delinquent in the

amount of $1,011.32 as of September 12, 1995, 2) property taxes on
the property were due and owing, 3) there was no adequate fire
insurance on the property.
4.

Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had

not paid any property taxes on the Property.

Property taxes for

1993, 1994 and 1995 were due and owing in the amount of $432.11,
$475.74 and $392.86 respectively
interest.)
2

(which included penalty and

5.

Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had

never insured the Property.
6.

On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the brother

of Derel K. Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, contacted Earl
Grossen, the beneficiary under the Trust Deed by telephone. Earl
Grossen and Ogden Dewitt reached a tentative agreement regarding
the payment of the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated was in the
amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and the Property
needed to be insured.
7.

Ogden Dewitt also agreed to immediately bring current all

unpaid taxes and insure the Property.
8.

Ogden Dewitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two payments, one of

$1,000 by the following Monday and one of $617.00 paid by the end
of the next week.
9.

After the January 25, 1996 telephone conversation, Earl

Grossen came to believe that defendants had violated the terms of
the Note

and Trust

Deed by quit claiming

the Property and

encumbering the Property contrary to the terms of the Trust Deed
Note without his consent.
10.

The Trust Deed Note provided that "The trustors shall not

sell or encumber the property without the Beneficiaries permission,
which shall not be unreasonably withheld."
3

11.

On April 21, 1994, defendants encumbered the Property

with a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents in favor of Transamerica
Financial Services.
12.

On October 25, 1995, defendant Afton H. Dewitt quit-

claimed her interest to Derel K. Dewitt.
13.

Earl Grossen believed these were done without his consent

and that defendants were not bargaining in good faith, and did not
finalize the agreement.
14.

Ogden Dewitt tendered both the $1#000 check and the

$617.00 check to Earl Grossen as per their tentative agreement, but
these checks were never cashed.
15.

Neither defendants nor Ogden Dewitt paid any of the

unpaid property taxes or insured the Property.
16.

On or about February 13, 1997, Ogden Dewitt and Earl

Grossen spoke on the telephone and Earl Grossen told Ogden Dewitt
the Meal was off."
17.

On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the Trustee for Earl

Grossen held a Trustee's Sale at the appointed time and place and,
no other bidders being present, bid in the amount then due and
owing under the Trust Deed Note.

A Trustee's Deed was then

executed by David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying the
property to Earl Grossen.
4

18.

Judgment was filed on May 7, 1997.

19.

Defendants

filed

their Rule

52(b) Motion

to Amend

Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict on June 3,
1997.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Earl Grossen7s motion for a directed verdict is granted

on the grounds that any oral agreement between Earl Grossen and
Ogden Dewitt, even if proved, is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds and the Counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Defendants' Motion to join Derek Shayne Dewitt as a

necessary party is denied.
3.

The Lis Pendens recorded against the Property by Derek K.

Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt is hereby released.
4.

Any issue as to attorney's fees were reserved at trial

and any claim for attorney's fees may be filed hereafter.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded $270 in rent for March 1, 1997

through March 27, 1997, and treble rent pursuant to the Utah
Unlawful Detainer Statute for March 28, 1997 through June 28, 1997
for $2,700 for judgment against Afton H. Dewitt and Derel K. Dewitt
in the total amount of $2,970 to bear interest at the prejudgment
rate of 10% from June 28, 1996 through the date hereof and
thereafter at the statutory post-judgment rate of interest.
5

6.

Plaintiff's claim for damages to the property is denied

on the grounds that plaintiff has failure to carry his burden of
proof that the damages were cause by defendants.
7.

Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact

and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict is untimely under Rule
52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is therefore denied.
8.

Even if the motion were timely, the Court declines to

reconsider its previous ruling on the merits except with respect to
the issue of whether to reinstate the lis pendens.
9*

A released lis pendens does not remain in effect during

appeal. A district court is not required to allow a lis pendens to
remain on property just in case there may be an appeal.
10.

The Dewitt's motion to reinstate the lis pendens on the

rty is denied.
Dated this

^

day of September, 1997.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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DATED: SEPTEMBER 5, 1997

DEREL K. DEWITT and AFTON H.
DEWITT,

RULING

Defendants and
Counterclaimants,

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

vs.
EARL L. GROSSEN,
Counterclaim Defendant.
This case comes before the court on defendants* Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend
Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict. Defendants request that the
court reconsider its ruling asserting that the court did not have the benefit of briefing
on applicable Utah case law. This ruling concerns the statute of frauds, the doctrines
of part performance and estoppel, and the release of a lis pendens.
First, defendants' motion is untimely. Apparently counsel for defendants
thought he had 30 days to file his Rule 52(b) motion when in fact only 10 are
allowed. The rule states, "Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and
may amend the judgment accordingly." Rule 52(b) URCP.

The Rule does allow for a
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motion to amend a judgment to be filed at the same time as a motion for a new trial
(Rule 59), but Rule 59(e) provides, "A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." The judgment was filed on
May 7, 1997. The defendants filed their motion to amend the findings and judgment
on June 3, 1997. The motion is untimely and therefore must be denied.
Second, even if the motion is timely, I decline to reconsider the applicability of
the doctrines of part performance and estoppel as they relate to the statute of frauds in
this case. On the merits of the case and where each party was adequately represented
at trial, I feel no compunction to reconsider the findings or the ruling, even with the
benefit of the parties' new briefs. I do, however, wish to clarify my ruling on the
release of the lis pendens.
My job is to rule with finality. I cannot base my rulings on the assumption
that one or more parties will appeal and yet rule with finality. I address the release of
the lis pendens in this light.
Defendants cite Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills. 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979) as justification for asking the court to reinstate the lis pendens on
Grossen's property. Hidden Meadows involved an action in equity seeking specific
performance of an option to purchase property. Defendants cite the language that, "
the [Supreme] Court has already recognized the full effectiveness of lis pendens
pending appeal." Hidden Meadows, 1247.

However defendants fail to note that the

lis pendens had not been released after the first trial in the lower court. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court later said in Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d. 1381, 1393 (1986), "In
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Hidden Meadows . . . this court held that an unreleased lis pendens remains in effect
pending appeal" (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court never said a released lis
pendens remains in effect pending appeal. I do not believe the Utah Supreme Court
intended to tie the hands of district court judges in order to prevent the release of a lis
pendens incidental to litigation just in case there might be an appeal. Such a
procedure would destroy finality in the lower courts and would unnecessarily burden
the alienation of property. The proper course is for the non-prevailing party to obtain
a stay pending appeal either from the court or by filing a supersedeas bond.
I decline to reinstate the lis pendens on Grossen's property.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Grossen's
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this _^_ day of September, 1997.
BY THE COURT:
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